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COMMENT
THE GOVERNMENT WE DESERVE? DIRECT DEMOCRACY,
OUTRAGED MAJORITIES, AND THE DECLINE OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE

ANDREA SPECHT*

Omnipotence in itself seems to me a bad and dangerous thing. ...
Therefore, when I see the right and wherewithal to do all accorded to any power whatsoever, whether it be called people or
king, democracy or aristocracy, and whether it be exercised in a
monarchy or a republic, I say, therein lies the seed of tyranny,
and I seek to live elsewhere, under different laws. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Frustrated by the perceived ineffectiveness and unresponsiveness of
their elected representatives? Americans are increasingly enamored of direct democracy as a means to advance their public policy agendas. The
tools of direct democracy include the direct initiative, which allows citizens
to enact new statutes or constitutional amendments; the indirect initiative,
which allows citizens to direct their elected representatives to do the same;
the popular referendum, which allows citizens to repeal a statute enacted by
the state legislature; and the recall, which allows citizens to remove an
elected official before the end of his or her term? From 1991 to 2000, 389
statewide initiatives appeared on ballots across the country,4 up 44 percent

* J.D .• University of St. Thomas School of Law, 2006; B.A. Macalester College, 1992. I
thank Dr. Charles Reid for his suggestions and encouragement.
1. ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA vol. 1, pt. 2, ch. 7, 290 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., The Library of America 2004).
2. Caroline J. Tolbert, Public Policy and Direct Democracy in the Twentieth Century: The
More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, in THE BATILE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING
35,38--40 (M. Dane Waters, ed., Carolina Academic Press 2(01).
3. See, e.g. JOHN HAsKELL, DIRECT DEMOCRACY OR REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT: DISPELLING THE POPUUST MYTH 48-49 (Westview Press 2(01); DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 35-36 (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 1984); M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 11 (Carolina Academic
Press 2(03) [hereinafter I and R Almanac]. Unless otherwise stated, this comment is concerned
with the direct initiative and the popular referendum only.
4. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 533 (App. D). It is important to distinguish statewide
initiatives (and referenda) from their local equivalents, which are available to residents of
thousands of American counties, cities, and towns. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INsTlTUTE, INITI.
132
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from the preceding decade and 33 percent from the previous record set in
the years 1911 to 1920.5 While advocates and opponents debate the desirability of this trend and what it portends, none dispute that the instruments of
direct democracy are powerful, if also blunt. 6
The initiative and referendum are powerful because they enable the
majority to determine the content and scope of minority rights; they are
blunt because they enable citizen lawmakers to act without the constraints
and incentives that temper their elected representatives. As direct democracy expands, the risk therefore grows that a tyranny of the majority will
emerge, eclipsing the rights 7 of persons outside the American mainstream.
While direct democracy proponents are inclined to downplay this risk, data
from recent studies confirm the growing vulnerability of persons of color,
gays and lesbians, non-English speakers, and other "outsiders." This vulnerability in tum implicates a seemingly unavoidable irony of direct democracy: the more common policymaking by plebiscite becomes, the more
frequently the judiciary-Le., the "least democratic branch" of government,
is called upon to uphold minority rights. 8
The judiciary confronts significant risk in fulfilling its obligations in
this regard. Americans are captivated by an increasingly totalitarian brand
of politics that targets judicial review and the judges who employ it as
problems in their own right. The uproar over ''judicial activism"9 is symptomatic of the overall politicization of the judiciary-a trend caused in part by
interest group influence over state judicial elections lO and at the federal
level, partisan exploitation of the judicial nomination process by RepubliATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN THE UNTIED STATES: A PluMER 5 (M. Dane Waters, ed., Citizen
Lawmaker Press 2(02), available at http://iandrinstitute.orglNew%20IRI%20Website%20InfolI&
R %20Research%20and%20HistorylI&R%20StudiesIWaters%20-%20I&R %20Primer%2OComplete%20IRI.pdf. Many jurisdictions that do not have statewide plebiscites (including Texas and
New York) allow local units of government to facilitate citizen lawmaking.ld. In fact, one-third to
one-half of all American cities-including fifteen of the twenty largest-allow local initiatives.
John G. Matsusaka, I & R in American Cities: Basic Patterns, in I and R Almanac. supra note 3,
at 31, 36. This comment addresses direct democracy at the statewide level only.
5. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 533.
6. See, e.g. Robin Charlow, Judicial Review. Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites. 79 CORNELL L. REv. 527,537 (1994) (noting that in contrast to the representative system,
initiatives and referenda allow "only isolated [yes/no] votes on single issues"); Michael Vitiello &
Andrew I. Glendon, Article III Judges and the Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges Hopelessly Elitist?, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1275, 1288 (1998) (noting that "the initiative process does
not allow for modification or compromise" when new information emerges).
7. For the purposes of tbis comment, the term "rights" denotes "civil rights" as defined by
Black's Law Dictionary: "The individual rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights and by the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 19th Amendments, as well as by legislation such as the
Voting Rights Act. Civil rights include esp. the right to vote, the right of due process, and the right
of equal protection under the law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 263 (8th ed. 2004).
8. See, e.g., RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN
AMERICA 176 (Univ. Press of Kansas 2(02).
9. See infra note 102.
10. See infra note 130.
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cans and Democrats alike. 11 More fundamentally, the growing politicization
of state and federal courts arises from an erroneous belief among Americans
that judges are (or should be) accountable in the same way legislators and
executives are-in other words, that their decisions should be "constituentdriven."12
The convergence and interplay of these two trends-the expansion of
direct democracy on the one hand and the increasing politicization of the
courts on the other-foreshadow a troubling period in the evolution of our
society. The influence of well-financed interest groups over both plebiscites
and judicial elections in key states is of particular concern, but the larger
issue is Americans' growing inability to recognize the value of courts as
necessarily counter-majoritarian guardians of the Constitution. This comment will summarize the history of direct democracy in the United States
and reflect on the connections between plebiscites, minority rights, and the
decline of judicial independence. It ultimately concludes that unless we reexamine our unqualified fidelity to "majority rule," Americans may lose the
very essence of the democracy we strive to maintain.
II.

DIRECT DEMOCRACY, MINORITY RIGHTS, AND
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

A.

The Rise of Direct Democracy in the United States

Direct democracy first emerged as a prominent influence on the American political scene as part of the Progressive Movement in the early
1900s.13 The Progressives sought to end the growing influence that big business and party bosses exercised over state legislatures and elected officials,
and to reclaim politics for the common man. 14 The Progressives' broader
aim was, in the words of one writer, to restore the "civic purity"15 they
associated with "America's mythic roots."16 This idealistic vision suc11. David A. Yalof, Dress Rehearsal Politics and the Case of Earmarked Judicial Nominees,
26 CARDOZO L. REv. 691, 691-94 (2005) (discussing the trend toward more prolonged and ideologically charged confirmation processes for federal judges).
12. Paul J. DeMuniz, Judicial Selection in Oregon: Money, Politics, and the Initiative Process, 39 WILLAME'ITE L. REv. 1265, 1265-66 (2003). See also infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
13. MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 21.
14. Id. at 21-22.
15. Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative,
Referendum, and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL'y REv. 11. 18 (1997)
(quoting Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.5-6 (1955».
16. Id (associating New England town hall meetings with these "mythic roots"). It is important to note that the Progressives were not the only turn of the century reformers to idealize the
common man and his place in American democracy. Key elements of Progressive ideology are
traceable to the Populists, who were active in the rural South and Midwest through the 1890s.
HASKELL. supra note 3. at 28-29. Deeper treatments of direct democracy's origins discuss both
groups and differentiate their approaches: while Populists advocated direct democracy as a replacement for representative government. Progressives saw it as an improvement on the existing
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ceeded in capturing the public imagination and inspiring an enduring legacy: from 1898 to 1918, twenty-two states amended their constitutions to
incorporate one or more instruments of direct democracy. 17
For the Progressives, direct democracy was both a good unto itself and
a vehicle for advancing a particular policy agenda. 18 Convinced that government action was necessary to mitigate the socially destructive consequences of industrialism, they promoted reforms ranging from minimum
wage, antitrust, and food safety regulations to Prohibition, women's suffrage and the graduated income tax. 19 To the extent that legislatures beholden to corporate interests were certain to reject many of these reforms on
principle, direct democracy was a critical vehicle for achieving social
change. In essence, direct democracy made legislatures moot by empowering average citizens to directly enact and repeal state laws.
The Progressives won their first victory for direct democracy in South
Dakota, which adopted the statewide initiative in 1898.10 Utah, Oregon, and
other states followed over the next twenty years, with North Dakota becoming the last of nineteen jurisdictions21 to place this powerful lawmaking tool
in citizens' hands before World War I temporarily halted the direct democracy movement. 22 It was not until 1956 that another state (Alaska) adopted
the statewide initiative,23 followed by Wyoming in 1968 and Illinois and
Florida in 1970 and 1972, respectively.14 In 1992, Mississippi became the
twenty-fourth and most recent state to incorporate initiative lawmaking.1s
Twenty-one of the twenty-four jurisdictions that allow statewide initiatives
system. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Miller, Courts as Watchdogs of the Washington State Initiative
Process, 24 SEATILE U. L. REv. 1053, 1058-60 (2001). Miller posits that these distinctions continue in the debate over direct democracy today, with contemporary Populists striking a more
radical anti-government tone than their Progressive, "good government" counterparts-many of
whom are growing increasingly disenchanted with citizen lawmaking. Id.
17. Persily, supra note 15, at 15.
18. Id. at 22-23; THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INmATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND REcALL 58-59 (Harvard Univ. Press 1989); TOLBERT, supra note 2, at 40.
19. CRONIN, supra note 18, at 58-59.
20. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 12.
21. Id.
22. Fearing the implications of Gennan aggression for the U.S., Americans lost their taste for
civic experimentation and equated patriotism "with defense of the status quo rather than its alteration." Id. at 4 (quoting CARL H. CHRISLOCK, THE PROGRESSIVE ERA IN MINNESOTA 1899-1918
(Minn. Hist. Soc'y 1971».
23. Id. at 6 (noting that Alaska's constitution provided for the initiative and referendum when
the Union admitted it in 1959).
24. Id. at 12.
25. Id. Jurisdictions with the direct statutory and/or constitutional initiative are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.Id. The most active states, in tenns of number of
statewide initiatives on the ballot from 1904 to 2002, are Oregon, California, Colorado, North
Dakota, and Arizona, respectively. Id. at 8.
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today also have popular referenda,26 while three states allow the latter
alone. 27
Initiative use has fluctuated greatly over the past one hundred years. 28
It declined steadily from the Progressives' heyday through the 1970s,29 then
rebounded dramatically after Californians enacted the widely publicized
and controversial Proposition 13 in 1978. 30 In the 1980s, 289 statewide initiatives appeared on ballots across the country; in the nineties, the total leapt
to a record 396.3 1 Although initiative use appears to be decreasing slightly
in the first decade of the twenty-first century,32 some of the most divisive
and important policy questions of the foreseeable future, includingquestions of constitutional rights, will undoubtedly be decided by citizen
lawmakers. 33
Numerous factors have contributed to the dramatic growth of direct
democracy over the past quarter-century. Activists on the political Left and
Right have discovered that regardless of whether initiatives or referenda
pass, the campaigns and intense media coverage surrounding them generate
broad popular awareness of the underlying issues. 34 The awareness in tum
26. Id.
27. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 12 (noting that citizens of Kentucky, Maryland, and
New Mexico can repeal state laws via the popular referendum but cannot place statewide initiatives on the ballot).
28. David Magleby, Taking the Initiative: Direct Legislation and Direct Democracy in the
I980s, 21 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 600, 603 (1988); M. Dane Waters, Testimony before the California Commission on the Initiative Process, THE INlTIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW OF
How IT WORKS AROUND TIlE COUNTRY 2 (Dec. 18,2000), available at http://www.cainitiative.
orglpdf/initiative_process_iri.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
29. Waters, supra note 28, at 2.
30. Proposition 13, which sharply limited the power of local governments to tax, became a
catalyst for a nationwide "taxpayer revolt" and the direct democracy movement in general.
CRONIN, supra note 18, at 3-4; I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 6; MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at

5-6.
31. Waters, supra note 28, at 3.
32. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 8. The decrease comes in spite of broad popular
support for citizen lawmaking. According to various polls, somewhere between two-thirds and
three-quarters of citizens favor the opportunity to vote on statewide ballot propositions. Julian N.
Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1507 n. 16 (1990); Waters, supra
note 28, at 3. One survey found that as many as eighty-five percent of Californians thought that
voting on ballot propositions was "a good idea." MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 9. Notwithstanding
the initiative's popularity, observers attribute its slowing (or at least static) usage rate to increased
regulation of direct democracy processes. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 8-9.
33. Kenneth P. Miller, The Courts and the Initiative Process, in I and R Almanac, supra note
3, at 459; see also, I and R Almonac, supra note 3, at 8-9; Eric Lane, Men are Not Angels: The
Realpolitik of Direct Democracy and What We Can Do about It, 34 WILLAMEITE L. REv. 579,
582-83 (1998).
34. David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 13,28-29 (1995); Magleby, supra note 28, at 604. An especially brazen use of the initiative to boost an issue's visibility is evident in circumstances where
interest groups draft and sponsor ballot items they know to be unconstitutional and therefore
doomed to failure in a post-election court challenge. See Daniel M. Warner, Direct Democracy:
The Right of the People to Make Fools of Themselves; The Use and Abuse of Initiative and
Referendum, A Local Government Perspective, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 47, 60-65 (1995).
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catapults the issues onto local and national policy agendas. 35 Candidates for
statewide office endorse and sponsor initiatives to benefit their campaigns,36 and sitting legislators use initiatives to avoid voting on divisive
issues, in favor of "let[ting] the voters decide.'>37 Other factors include the
growth of a highly profitable initiative industry;38 increasing voter hostility
toward government itself;39 the career-launching potential of initiatives for
individual activists;40 the emergence of counter-propositions on ballots;41
the appeal of direct democracy's immediate and tangible impact on public
policy (relative to candidate elections);42 and rapidly changing
demographics. 43
From 1898 through the 1980s, initiatives across the country were distributed relatively equally among issue categories such as housing, taxation,
business regulation, public health, morality, and welfare. 44 These categories
continue to reflect the topics initiatives address, but since the late 1970s, a
majoritarian backlash against the progress of minorities has significantly
influenced the overall direction of citizen lawmaking.45 The most provocative data establish that when minority rights are the express subjects of bal35. Magleby, supra note 34, at 28-29; see also, Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of
Initiatives and Referenda in which Majorities Vote on Minorities' Democratic Citizenship, 60
OHIO ST. LJ. 399,471-472 (1999). Even failed initiatives appear to have an additional and socially destructive "side effect": increasing public animosity toward unpopular minorities. See. e.g.,
William E. Adams, Jr., Is It Animus or a Difference of Opinion? The Problems Caused by the
Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay Ballot Measures, 34 WILLAMETrB L. REv. 449, 468-70 (1998) (discussing the correlation between initiative campaigns and increases in hate crimes perpetrated
against gay men and lesbians).
36. ELLIS, supra note 8, at 80 (noting the "increasingly prominent role" elected officials and
candidates play in authoring and/or sponsoring initiatives).
37. Id.
38. Magleby, supra note 34, at 30-31.
39. MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 14-15.
40. Id.
41. Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, An Overview of Direct Democracy in the States, in
CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS I, 10 (Ohio St. Univ. Press, 1998) (defining a counterproposal as "a
rapidly qualified initiative designed to deflect attention from an opponent's initiative").
42. Magleby, supra note 34, at 30-31.
43. See Caroline J. Tolbert & Rodney E. Hero, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation:
The Battle in the States over Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 325-327 nn.l0-11
(1990) (noting that many commentators view the "English-only movement" as a backlash against
an increasing number of immigrants, and citing the exclusive reliance of "English-only proponents" on direct democracy instruments over "a mix of legislative, administrative, and judicial
action").
44. Magleby, supra note 28, at 603.
45. See Lazos Vargas, supra note 35, at 421 ("In the late 19708 and early 1980s, initiatives
and referendUIns increasingly became a democratic device through which majorities opposed integration and anti-discrimination laws."); Adams, supra note 35, at 458 ("During the past two decades, the number of ballot measures aimed at limiting or reversing legal protections of lesbians
and gay men have proliferated."); HASKELL, supra note 3, at 109 (discussing journalist Peter
Schrag's argument that Californians' predilection for tax-cutting initiatives reflects "an effort by
the white middle class to reassert its control over California politics ... just when ethnic minorities are finally able to wield some power in the legislature....").
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lot propositions, citizens vote to limit or eliminate those rights as often as
eight out of ten times. 46

B.

Direct Democracy and Minority Rights

Among the many arguments for and against direct democracy,47 one of
the most widely debated questions is whether direct democracy infringes
minority rights at a rate greater than representative democracy.48 Some of
the disagreement stems from the absence of a uniform definition of "minority" in this context. 49 A lack of empirical data showing how minority rights
fare in legislatures relative to plebiscites adds further ambiguity. In spite of
these complexities, analyses drawing on thirty years of experience with the
initiative and referendum are beginning to compel the conclusion that for
many minority groups, "the more direct democracy becomes, the more
threatening it is.''50
In a widely cited 1978 article, Professor Derrick Bell, Jr., argues that
Americans' increasing reliance on direct democracy portends a crisis for
racial and other minoritiesY According to Bell, the rise of citizen lawmaking is problematic for two reasons. First, the pervasive nature of racism in
America compels low-income whites to prioritize "[p]reserving white superiority" above "mounting a unified attack" on the economic advantages that
affluent whites have over both blacks and poor whites. 52 Second, unlike
their elected representatives, voters may act on racial motivations alone;
they are unencumbered by professional aspirations and unmotivated by
practical incentives to compromise with fellow lawmakers. 53 For Bell, the
convergence of racism and referenda yields an all too predictable result:
when white voters have the opportunity to repeal any law remediating racial
disparity, they seize it. 54 Bell observes that
46. Laws Vargas, supra note 35, at 399.
47. A discussion of these arguments (outside of those touching on the issue of minority
rights) is beyond the scope of this comment but widely available in the literature on direct democracy. See e.g. CRONIN, supra note 18, at 10-12; MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 27-30.
48. See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Clwice Perspective,
67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 707, 709 (1991); Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular
Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. So. 245, 245 (1997).
49. See infra notes 59, 62 (discussing why two researchers opted to exclude women from
their definitions of "minority" for the purposes of analyzing initiative and referenda outcomes).
50. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH.
L. REv. 1, 1 (1978-79).
51. ld. at 2.
52. ld. at 10-11.
53. ld. at 13-14.
54. ld. at 12-13. Bell's discussion begins with two Supreme Court decisions involving
states' attempts to ensure affordable housing for low-income persons, many of whom are also
persons of color. In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), Bell writes, a 5-3 majority upheld
Article 34 of the California constitution over a challenge brought by poor blacks and MexicanAmericans. ld. at 2-3. Under Article 34, state public bodies were prohibited from developing
federally financed low income housing without the prior approval of voters in local referenda. ld.
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despite our wealth, we lag behind [numerous other] countries ...
in addressing basic problems of poverty, slum housing, public
health, and prison reform, because in those countries, "there is no
parallel to the corrosive and pervasive role played by race in the
problem of social neglect in the United States." ... Americans
refuse to support social reforms because they sense such reforms
would mainly aid undeserving blacks. 55
In short, Bell's basic premise is that the deeply entrenched racism of
white voters will operate to transform popular referenda-regardless of the
policy issues those referenda address (for example, housing, public health,
and local taxation)-into vehicles for maintaining racial inequality.
Bell's concern about the destructive potential of direct democracy
finds support in two studies analyzing the effect of initiatives and referenda
on minorities over time. 56 The fJIst of these studies, conducted by Professor
Barbara Gamble, establishes that majorities routinely utilize direct democracy to decide issues of minority rights, and that anti-minority initiatives are
extraordinarily successful at the ballot box. 57 Specifically, Gamble analyzed
state and local ballot propositions focused on minority rights from 1959
through 1993, and concluded that minority interests were defeated 78 percent of the time. 58 She found that across five policy areas, including minority housing, school desegregation, gay rights, English-language use, and
at 3. Because Article 34 did not rely on "distinctions based on race," Bell suggests, the majority
refused to subject it to even a "token" (rational basis) Equal Protection review, notwithstanding
the de facto hardship Article 34 created for minorities.ld. at 3-5. "As long as the disadvantage to
minorities [from mandatory referenda] is not intentionally racial and arguably furthers a reasonable interest," Bell concludes, "judicial intervention is not forthcoming." Id. at 5.
In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), the Court upheld a
provision in the charter of suburb Eastlake, Ohio, which conditioned all zoning changes on a "yes"
vote from 55 percent of local referendum voters. Bell, supra note 50, at 6. The Ohio Supreme
Court had determined that the mandatory referendum provision "frustrated a multi-family, high
rise apartment project, in violation of the owner-developer's due process rights." Id. Reflecting on
the implication of Valtierra and City of East Lake for minorities, Bell opines that in these cases,
"the seemingly neutral, proper encouragement of direct community control implemented through
a popular referendum established direct democracy as a constitutionally sanctioned vehicle for
excluding the poor and, therefore, minorities." Bell, supra note 50, at 7 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 12-13 (quoting economist Robert Heilbroner, The Roots of Social Neglect in the
United States, in Is LAW DEAD? 288, 296 (E. Rostow ed., 1971». Many commentators link seemingly race-neutral, tax-related initiatives such as California's Proposition 13 to white, middle-class
hostility toward economic and social justice for poor persons and minorities. See, e.g., Julian N.
Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the Threat oj Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 733, 733 (1994) (noting that these populations were disproportionately
hurt by Proposition 13).
56. Gamble, supra note 48; Lazos Vargas, supra note 35.
57. Gamble, supra note 48, at 261.
58. Id. at 254; but see Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, Direct Democracy and Minority
Rights: An Extension, 42 AM. J. PoL. SCI. 1020, 1020 (1998) (critiquing Gamble's analysis because it fails to account for "the scale over which [direct] democracy is practiced," and arguing
that statewide elections are more likely than local ones to produce "pro-gay policy outcomes").
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AIDS,59 voters repealed civil rights laws that were already in effect, passed
laws that prohibited legislatures from protecting minorities, and overruled
legislators who sought to expand civil rights guarantees. 6O Gamble's findings are consistent with an analysis Professor Sylvia Lazos Vargas conducted of initiatives and referenda from 1960 through 1998.61 Drawing
from a comprehensive review of nationwide ballot propositions on the
rights of raciaVethnic and culturaVlanguage minorities, gay men and lesbians, and illegal immigrants,62 Lazos Vargas concluded that more than 80
percent of the time, direct democracy "decreased the content of, or staved
off advances in, minority rights. "63
These data raise two questions central to the arguments of Bell and
others: does direct democracy infringe minority rights to any greater extent
than representative democracy does, and if so, why?64 After all, as Thomas
Cronin writes in response to this question, "the record of representative
government is an imperfect one."65 Notwithstanding the lack of empirical
data on the relative performance of these two systems,66 two realities about
the political process compel the conclusion that state legislatures protect
minority rights more reliably than citizen lawmakers.
59. Gamble, supra note 48, at 246. Gamble analyzed ballot items affecting the rights of
"racial, ethnic, and language minorities, gay men and lesbians, and people with AIDS." Id. at 252.
Her study excluded initiatives and referenda deciding questions of women's rights, because women form an electoral majority and their advocates "have a marked advantage" relative to other
groups in relation to generating favorable outcomes through direct democracy. Id. at 252-53. The
exclusion of women's rights issues from her study, Gamble notes, is significant because commentators on direct democracy who are skeptical that direct democracy facilitates a "tyranny of the
majority" generally "bolster their case by pointing to [the fate of] women's rights issues" at the
ballot box. Id. at 253. Accord Lazos Vargas, supra note 35, at 422.
60. Gamble, supra note 48, at 254.
61. Lazos Vargas, supra note 35, at 422-23.
62. Lazos Vargas excluded ballot items concerning women's rights issues because even
though they fit her definition of a minority group, "women appear to be a special case," in part
because they comprise more than 50 percent of the population. Id. at 404 n. 14.
63. Id. at 424-25.
64. Professor Clayton Gillette and others are skeptical that initiatives are more likely to produce anti-minority outcomes than are laws enacted by legislatures. Clayton P. Gillette, Is Direct
Democracy Anti-Democratic?, 34 WILLAMETIE L. REv. 609, 621-22 (1998).
65. CRONIN, supra note 18, at 91-92 (discussing, inter alia, the internment of Americans of
Japanese heritage in the 1940s); see also Julian N. Eule, Representative Government: The People's Choice, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 777,787 (1991) ("Legislators can be bigots too."); Hans A.
Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19,35 n. 69 (1993) (discussing the role of "passions" in motivating
state legislatures' actions).
66. Eule, supra note 32, at 1551-52 (noting that "reliable empirical studies [comparing the
performance of direct democracy and representative democracy] do not exist"). Comparative data
would be impracticable, if not impossible, to generate. The number of legislative acts researchers
would have to consider is but one of many barriers. For example, ballots across the nation included a record-setting 102 statewide measures in 1996; in the same year, the legislatures of the
twenty-four direct democracy states enacted more than 17,000 laws out of an unspecified number
of bills considered. Waters, supra note 28, at 1-2.
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First, when a legislator casts her vote on a bill addressing any subject,
she is accountable to a constituency.67 A citizen lawmaker, in contrast, is
accountable only to himself. Unlike the legislator, he need not worry over
angry phone calls or e-mail messages awaiting his return from the ballot
box.68 He need not reflect on his express or implied promise to represent as
many of his constituents as he can, as well as he can. And from a purely
pragmatic standpoint, he need not worry about securing minority constituents' votes if and when he seeks reelection. Some legislators' districts are
more demographically and ideologically diverse than others', but all representatives are accountable to a portion of constituents who oppose the majority's position on any given issue. As Professor Bell observes,
Throughout this country's history, politicians have succumbed to
the temptation to ... appeal[ ] to the desire of whites to dominate
blacks. More recently, however, the growing black vote has begun to have an impact and even effected "Road to Damascus"
conversions on more than a few political Pauls, some of whom
even claim "born again" experiences during mid-term. This impact may be subverted if voting majorities may enact controversial legislation directly.69
Second, compromise, coalition-building, and logrolling (that is, votetrading) inhere in the legislative process. 70 Accordingly, there are powerful
incentives for a legislator to avoid alienating colleagues whose support she
may later require. By withholding support from a measure that the majority
of her peers consider too divisive or extreme, she protects her ability to gain
others' votes on bills more important to her constituents. While some may
speculate that this check on extreme positions is waning as legislatures become increasingly polarized, it is unquestionably the case that an individual
voter has no incentive-even in theory-to moderate his actions at the ballot box in order to preserve maneuvering room for later pieces of
legislation.
This comment accepts the validity of the foregoing arguments,71 but its
central concerns do not rely on the conclusion that plebiscites are more
67. Marei A. Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH.
1,6-7 (1997) (discussing the fact that representatives, unlike individual voters, are
accountable to the "conunon good"); Lane, supra note 33, at 594 (stating that representatives, not
voters, must consider a variety of factors, including their constituents' views).
68. In a 1983 poll of nearly 10,000 registered California voters, eighty-six percent agreed
with the statement, "Initiative and referendum would allow the public to decide issues where the
public officials are hesitant to act for fear of offending certain groups." Thomas E. Cronin, Public
Opinion and Direct Democracy, 21 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 612, 614 (1988) (citation omitted).
69. Bell, supra note 50, at 13 (citations omitted).
70. On the relationship between protecting minority rights and the political realities of logrolling and coalition-building, see Lane, supra note 33, at 591-92.
71. The arguments are subject to spirited debate, as are all arguments from theory. Professor
Lynn Baker has argued from public choice theory that rational, self-interested racial minorities
will not necessarily prefer representative over direct lawmaking processes. Baker, supra note 48,
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likely than legislatures to infringe minority rights when given the chance.
The point is that as direct democracy expands, citizen lawmakers are increasingly in a position to determine the scope of minority rights-and
more often than not, these rights are curtailed when subject to a popular
vote.
C.

The Critical Role of the Courts

The judiciary is the only functioning check on majority power in the
context of direct democracy. While most direct democracy proponents accept a counter-majoritarian role for the courts, at least to a degree,n a few
decry the very notion that a check is needed. What could be more elitistmore un-American, even-than the idea that "the People" must be protected from the exercise of their own will? This line of thinking is problematic because it assumes that plebiscitary outcomes actually reflect majority
will. Moreover, even if initiatives and referenda were accurate gauges of the
majority's policy preferences, such preferences are not ipso facto constitutional. 73 Our founders were acutely aware of the threat unchecked majorities pose to unpopular groups and viewpoints, and they created a judiciary
strong enough to overcome that threat. The involvement of the courts in
safeguarding the Constitution from citizen lawmakers' overreaching is not
only necessary, but proper.
In the twenty-six direct democracy states, courts are minorities' last
and only protection against unconstitutional initiatives for reasons both
structural and political. Structurally, legislators in ten of these states-including three of the five with greatest initiative use-are either absolutely
prohibited or materially limited from repealing or amending statutory initiatives. 74 One common limitation prohibits legislators from amending or appealing an initiative for periods from two to seven years after enactment. 75
From the political standpoint, while legislators in eleven states can amend
at 710; but see Eule, supra note 65 (refuting Baker's four central conclusions) and HASKELL,
supra note 3, at III (noting that Baker's arguments have largely been discredited).
72. In responding to direct democracy critics who are concerned about minority rights, proponents cite the safety net provided by judicial review. HASKELL, supra note 3, at 112.
73. See Charlow, supra note 6, at 544-45 (Unlike their elected representatives, citizen
lawmakers have no "explicit constitutional obligation" to see that their actions comport with the
Constitution. Moreover, citizen lawmakers have no "particular incentive or ability" to discern
what the Constitution requires.); see also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v.
City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,295 (1981) (asserting that "voters may no more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot measure than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation")
(quoted in Eule, supra note 32, at 1505-06).
74. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 27 (California legislators cannot appeal or amend at
any time; a range of limitations inhibit legislators' ability to do so in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.). As stated in note 25, the
five states with the greatest initiative use are Oregon, California, Colorado, North Dakota, and
Arizona.
75. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 27.
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or repeal a statutory initiative at any time,76 they are arguably unlikely to do
SO.77 Minorities cannot depend on these legislators to amend or repeal the
outcomes of direct democracy; the political costs of doing so would be ruinous. At this moment in America, after all, there can be no epithet more
damning for a politician than "elitist."78
Even if one accepts the premise that our laws should be whatever "the
People" desire at any given moment, one must still ask, does the outcome of
a statewide plebiscite actually reveal the majority will? For a variety of
reasons, the answer from many social scientists is a resounding "no."79
First, fewer than 50 percent of American adults regularly vote,80 and of
those who do, "voter fatigue" and other factors cause some electors to vote
only for the candidates on their ballots, not the issue propositions. 81 Moreover, those who vote on propositions do not accurately reflect the electorate
itself. 82 Second, misleading issue campaigns, ambiguous proposition language, and the emergence of counterproposals on ballots have contributed
to widespread voter confusion and miscast votes. 83 Third, interest groups
and wealthy individual activists wield enormous power in shaping what are
later accepted as the policy preferences of "the majority" because these
groups-not the voters themselves-select and draft the ballot questions. 84
Finally, proponents of public choice theory posit that as a result of "the
paradox of voting," a plebiscite will never accurately determine the popular
will. 85 In light of the foregoing problems, two commentators go so far as to
76. Id. (noting that in these states, legislative repeal or amendment requires just a simple
majority vote in both houses),
77. ELLIS, supra note 8, at 126.
78. See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S TIlE MATTER WITH KANSAS: How CONSERVATIVES WON
THE HEART OF AMERICA 113-37 (Metro. Books 2004).
79. See e.g. Sherman Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARv. L. REv.
434 (1998); Eule, supra note 32, at 1513-22; HASKELL, supra note 3, at 121-46; Vitiello &
Glendon, supra note 6, at 1285-89.
80. Eule, supra note 32, at 1514.
81. Itf. at 1515; CRONIN, supra note 18, at 75-77.
82. CRONIN, supra note 18, at 77 (citing a survey of Massachusetts voters that showed "people with higher incomes, Republicans, liberals, and males were more likely than others to vote on
ballot propositions"); Eule, supra n. 32, at 1515 (noting that those who vote on ballot propositions
are, relative to voters in general, "disproportionately well-educated, affluent, and white").
83. Eule, supra note 32, at 1517.
84. ELLIS, supra note 8, at 77-79.
85. HASKELL, supra note 3, at 13. Haskell summarizes the four central tenets of public choice
theory as follows:
1) The paradox of voting concerns the relationship of individual choice to group
choice. The paradox is that whereas an individual can make a rational, logical, and
coherent ordering of choices, options, or candidates presented to him or her, it is often
impossible for a group, even one made up of well-informed and rational individuals, to
order its choices coherently.
2) Majorities in electoral party politics are really unstable coalitions of minorities
that rarely if ever express clear and comprehensive policy instructions.
3) Different legitimate and widely used methods of voting often produce different
winners.
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suggest that independent judges may better reflect a broad consensus on
divisive social issues than the initiative process does. 86
Setting aside the myriad problems inherent in determining the will of
"the People," it is important to remember that unfiltered majority rule has
never been the quest of American democracy.87 Our founders created a system with numerous counter-majoritarian elements,88 including a Senate capable of mitigating the variable and occasionally "unenlightened"
policymaking of the larger and more directly accountable House of Representatives. 89 In a prescient passage on the necessity of bicameralism, James
Madison wrote, "[T]here are particular moments in public affairs when the
people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or
misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament
and condemn. "90
Another counter-majoritarian institution our founders created is an independent judiciary91 capable of "guard[ing] the Constitution and the rights
of individuals from the effects of those ill humors . . . which sometimes
disseminate among the people themselves" and occasionally give rise to
"serious oppressions of the minor party in the community."92 Admittedly,
the founders designed the judiciary to check the power of citizens' representatives to the federal government; after all, initiatives and referenda
"were virtually unknown to them."93 But no leap of imagination is required
to conclude that had the founders envisioned the rise of direct democracy,
they would have deemed an independent judiciary necessary to safeguard
the Constitution not only from the people's representatives, but from the
people themselves. 94
4) Any decision-making process used by a group to decide among three or more
options may be manipulated by strategic voters.
Id. (citations omitted).
86. Vitiello & Glendon, supra note 6, at 1277.
87. Chadow, supra note 6, at 533-41; ELLIS, supra note 8, at 122-23; Eule. supra note 65, at
784.
88. These elements include bicameral legislatures. legislative committees, the presidential
veto, and the "[s]upennajorities [that] are sprinkled throughout the Constitution." ELLIS, supra
note 8, at 122; see also Vitiello & Glendon, supra note 6, at 1290.
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 390 (James Madison) (Willmoore Kendall & George W.
Carey eds., 1966).
90. Id. at 384.
91. Charlow, supra note 6, at 560-61.
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). supra note 89, at 469.
93. Eule, supra note 32, at 1523 (citation omitted).
94. See id.
It is idle ... to speculate how the delegates [to the Constitutional Convention] might
have responded to a proposal that the Constitution contain provisions for initiatives or
referenda.... But everything about the tone of the Convention suggests that they would
have looked upon such a scheme 'with a feeling akin to horror.
(citation omitted). Of course, as a philosophical and a practical matter, "[i]t is one thing for a court
to undertake the task of protecting the people from their government and quite another to protect
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The fact that courts serve as the primary check on citizen lawmaking is
evident in the ubiquity of lawsuits over initiatives and referenda. 95 In the
1990s, more than half of all initiatives in three of the five most active direct
democracy states were challenged in state or federal COurt. 96 The courts
struck down 55 percent of the challenged laws in whole or in part,97 most
often because they violated individual rights protected by the U.S. and/or
state constitutions. 9s The abrogated rights included those of free speech,
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, equal protection, and procedural and substantive due process. 99

m.

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE ENDANGERED

The expansion of citizen lawmaking generally and its use to decide
minority rights questions in particular further threaten the precarious position American courts have occupied since the Supreme Court decided Marbury v. Madison. tOO To the delight of some and the dismay of others, it is a
the people from themselves." Id. at 1585. One of the most widely debated questions vis-a-vis
judicial review of direct democracy is the appropriate standard of review courts should apply.
Whether the proper standard is stricter than, equal to, or more deferential than that applied to
legislative enactments is beyond the scope of this comment.
95. See Kenneth P. Miller, The Role of Courts in the Initiative Process: A Search for Standartls I, II (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n, Sep. 1999), available at http://www.iandrinstitute.orglStudies.
htrn (arguing that courts have "become the meta-check on the initiative process" and describing
the 1990s as "the Golden Age of initiative litigation"); see also Craig B. Holman & Robert Stem,
Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and Federal Courts, 31 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 1239, 1256--58 (1998) ("Federal litigation is ... fast becoming another step in an
opposition campaign strategy. If opponents fail to defeat an initiative at the ballot box, a portion of
the campaign budget is routinely set aside to contest the initiative in federal court."); John Jacobs,
Poll: Voters Like Initiative Process, But Want It Fixed, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 9, 1997, at B7
(quoting University of California Berkeley Political Scientist Gene Lee's characterization of the
overloaded judiciary as an "extraordinary cost" of the initiative explosion).
96. Miller, supra note 95, at 2 (analyzing litigation over initiatives in California, Oregon, and
Colorado). State courts adjudicated roughly two times more initiative challenges than federal
courts did, but the latter were "somewhat more likely" to invalidate the challenged law. Id. at 3.
The prevailing explanation for why federal courts are more likely to strike down initiatives stems
from the relative security and therefore independence offederaljudges (who have lifetime tenure)
compared to their elected state counterparts. Id. at 13 (citing Gerald F. Uelman, Crocodiles in the
Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1133 (1977) and Vitiello & Glendon, supra note 6); see Holman &
Stem, supra note 95, at 1240-41; but see Richard L. Hasen, Judging the Judges of Initiatives: A
Comment on Holman and Stem, 31 Loy. LA L. REv. 1267, 1267-70 (1998) (questioning the
empirical basis for the conclusion that federal judges are less deferential to initiatives than are
California state judges).
97. Miller, supra note 95, at 2.
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 22. Undoubtedly some of the violations of "individual rights" included in Miller's
analysis are not violations of "minority" rights per se. Notwithstanding the distinction, the fact
remains that in an era when social policy is increasingly shaped by direct democracy, the courts
"stand virtually alone" in countering majoritarian excess. Id. at 29. Attempts to curtail the courts'
checking power, therefore, endanger unpopular minorities most.
100. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Marbury established that among the three branches of government,
the Supreme Court decides whether legislative acts comply with the Constitution. In cases con-
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posItion that may soon be untenable. The more diligently the judiciary
meets its obligation to safeguard minorities' constitutionally protected
rights, the more vulnerable it is to backlash from outraged majorities. The
backlash in tum threatens judicial independence, 101 thereby undermining
courts' capacity to check abuses of raw majority power. Rage against the
courts is evident in incendiary criticism that foments hostility toward "activist" judges 102 and erodes public confidence in the state and federal judiciaries. It is also evident in the so-called "reforms" that some radical
activists, officials, and interest groups propose to curtail the power and autonomy of the courts.
The gathering threat to judicial independence has numerous causes
apart from the outrage generated by invalidated initiatives. In fact, the
growing popularity of direct democracy is a product of many of the same
economic, social, and technological developments that have placed the
courts at the center of local and national politics. 103 But shared origins are
only one dimension of the relationship between the rise of the initiative and
the decline of judicial independence. In a 1994 article, Professor Julian Eule
identified a causal dimension between these two trends, stating:
[J]udicial protection is most needed in the face of voter measures
motivated by popular passion or prejudice. Yet it is precisely
when electorally accountable judges stand up to such efforts that
ceming constitutionally suspect acts, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, "It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." [d. at 177. According to
historian Joel B. Grossman, Marbury is "the poster child of the American legal system." Martha
Neil, Cases and Controversies: Some Decisions Are All the Rage-Literally, ABAJournal.com,
http://www.abanet.orgljournaVredesignllOfmad.html (Sep. 29, 2(05) (last visited Jan. 27, 2(07).
101. For the purposes of this comment, "judicial independence" denotes decisional and institutional independence as elucidated in the following definition from the American Judicature Society (AJS):
Judicial independence is a concept that expresses the ideal state of the judicial branch of
government. The concept encompasses the idea that individual judges and the judicial
branch as a whole should work free of ideological influence. Scholars have broken
down the general idea of judicial independence into two distinct concepts: decisional
independence and institutional, or branch, independence. Decisional independence refers to a judge's ability to render decisions free from political or popular influence based
solely on the individual facts and applicable law. Institutional independence describes
the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of
government.
AJS, What is Judicial Indepedence?, http://www.ajs.orglcji/cjLwhatisji.asp (last visited Jan. 27,
2(07).
102. Though the phrase ')udicial activist" has lately been associated primarily with critics
from the political right, when either Republicans or Democrats "seek to criticize judges or judicial
nominees, they often resort to the same language ... the word 'activist' is rarely defined. Often it
simply means that the judge makes decisions with which the critic disagrees." Paul Gewirtz &
Chad Golder, Editorial, So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, Jui. 6, 2005, at A19.
103. These developments include, inter alia, the "tabloidization" of American media and the
ascension of the "sound bite" as a replacement for thoughtful analysis and reporting of complex
issues, the increasingly partisan nature of the political sphere, and an increasingly active and well
funded cadre of special interest groups and single-issue activists. Uelman, supra note 96, at
1134-35.
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they are most at risk. A judiciary that is directly accountable to
the identical forces which shaped the judgment under review may
find it difficult to provide sustained enforcement of more deliberative constitutional norms. 104
In the eleven years since Professor EuIe's article, it has become abundantly clear that both electorally accountable state judges and life-tenured
federal judges are vulnerable to an increasingly destructive backlash from
organized interests that see the courts as an impediment to their policy
agendas.
A.

The Targeting of Individual Judges

To varying degrees, judges in both the federal and state judiciaries are
vulnerable to political pressures. Federal judges are appointed by the president with "advice and consent" from the Senate and enjoy lifetime tenure
"during good behaviour,"lo5 while judges in thirty-nine states are in some
way accountable to the electorate. 106 Elected judges face well-funded and
increasingly successful campaigns to prevent their reelection, often on the
basis of one unpopular opinion. 107 But appointed judges-both federal and
state-are also under siege from impeachment campaigns and other forms
of reprisal.10 8 Although calls for impeachment have met with relatively little success,l09 they have chilling effects of their own. Regardless of what
form they take, attacks on individual judges influence judicial decisionmak104. Eule, supra note 55, at 739; see also Miller, supra note 16, at 1055 (discussing voter
frustration with courts that overturn initiatives and stating that "the same Populist impulse that
drives initiative lawmaking can further politicize the judiciary and threaten its independence").
105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.; U.S. CONST. art. ill, § L As previously discussed, the
Framers viewed lifetime tenure as a way to insulate the federal judiciary from encroachment by
the other braches of government and to thwart "mob rule." Vitiello & Glendon, supra note 6, at
1290.
106. Rachel Paine Caufield, The Foreboding National Trends in Judicial Elections, Presentation to the Iowa Judges Conference 1 (June 24, 2005), available at http://www.ajs.orglselectionl
docslcaufield_iajudges30nference.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2006). Among the thirty-nine states
are those with partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, and "hybrid" systems. ld. Judges Sitting on
the highest courts of all but two direct initiative states (Maine and Massachusetts) are ultimately
accountable to voters. Eule, supra note 55, at 735.
107. Caufield, supra note 106, at 4; George Hodak ed., Judges in the Culture Wars Crossfire,
A.B.A. J., Oct 5, 2005, http://www.abanet.orgljournallredesigniIOfround.html (last visited Feb.
10,2006).
108. Death threats and acts of physical violence against American judges are also on the rise.
Julian Borger, Former Top Judge says U.S. Risks Edging Near to Dictatorship, TIm GUARDIAN
(London), Mar. 13, 2006, at 19 (reporting on a speech by former Supreme Court Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, in which the latter "noted [that] death threats against judges were on the rise");
Judge Damon Keith, Editorial, Court Critics Out of Order? Yes: Recent Attacks on Independence
of Judges Endanger Democracy, DETROIT FREE PREss. Apr. 16,2006, at IE (describing specific
threats made against Supreme Court justices Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Sandra Day O·Connor).
109. Impeachment of federal judges by the House of Representatives has taken place only
thirteen times since 1789. Butch Mabin, Ginsburg speaks at UNL, LINCOLN STAR J. (Lincoln,
Neb.), Apr. 8, 2006, available at http://journalstar.comJarticles/2006/04107Ilocalld0c4436adb57e
62e783323426.txt (citing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
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ing by increasing the personal and professional risks for judges who interpret the law in ways at odds with the majority's preferences. Such attacks
also erode public confidence in the judiciary itself.
Attacks on numerous judges over the past twenty years illuminate the
increasing politicization of the judiciary and its implications for judicial
independence. For example, retention elections for California Supreme
Court justices passed without much attention until the mid-l 980s. 110 Then
in 1986, Chief Justice Rose Bird and Associate Justices Joseph Grodin and
Cruz Reynoso lost their seats in the wake of what many insiders considered
a purely political campaign.lll Especially rankled by the justices' rulings in
death penalty cases, 1 12 conservative activists spent more than seven million
dollars to oust them 1l3 by funding campaign ads equating "no votes"
against the justices with "yes votes" for the death penalty.u 4 Voters defeated Bird by a two-to-one margin, apparently convinced by conservatives'
portrayal of her as a "left-wing zealot who arrogantly refused to implement
laws the people wanted."IlS
Similarly, in 1990, Mississippi voters ousted Supreme Court Justice
Joel Blass in favor of an opponent who portrayed him as "soft on crime." 1 16
Un surprisingly, the winning candidate-a self-described "tough judge for
tough times"-had secured the endorsement of the Mississippi Prosecutors
Association. ll7 Also that year, anti-abortion interest groups in Florida attempted to oust then Chief Justice Leander Shaw, Jr.II s Their effort was
unsuccessful, but it required Shaw to raise and spend $300,000 to retain his
seat. 1I9 The same forces organized in 1992 against Florida Supreme Court
Associate Justice Rosemary Barkett, this time joined by prosecutors and
police who decried a single dissenting opinion from Barkett in a death penalty case. 120 Barkett held on to her seat after receiving nearly 61 percent of
the vote, but the single death penalty decision cost her an appointment to
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. l2l Also in 1992, pro-death
110. Maura Dolan, Rose Bird's Questfor Obscurity; Voted out in 1986 after a Firestorm of
Controversy, the Former Chief Justice of California is Ponrayed by Some as a Struggling Recluse, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at AI.
111. Anthony Murray, Editorial, Once is Enough, Don't Settle Judicial Scores, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 1987, at Metro 5.
112. Uelman, supra note 96, at 1136.
1l3. Murray, supra note 111.
114. Uelman. supra note 96, at 1136.
115. Dolan, supra note 110.
116. Uelman, supra note 96, at 1137.
117. 1d.
118. 1d. at 1140 (footnote omitted).
119. [d.
120. [d. The police and prosecutors were apparently unmoved by Barkett's overall record in

death penalty cases; in her previous nine years on the bench, she had voted to affirm more than
two hundred death sentences. [d.
121. Id.
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penalty interests succeeded in removing Mississippi Supreme Court Associate Justice James Robertson on the basis of two dissenting opinions. 122
Four years later, activists orchestrated the defeat of Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White-the first judge ever removed by voters
in the state's twenty-two year history of retention elections for appellate
courtS. 123 After taking advantage of free media coverage to position the
contest as "a referendum on the death penalty," conservatives celebrated
White's defeat, deeming it "the first blow in their battle 'to take back the
courts.' ,,124 The hostility against White stemmed from a single death penalty decision. 125 Nebraska Supreme Court Justice David Lanphier also fell
prey to voter backlash in 1996, his defeat attributable to the same wellfinanced interests that sponsored the successful term limits initiative he
voted to overturn. 126
More recently, Nevada Supreme Court Justice Deborah Agosti survived a recall campaign that anti-tax activists mounted in 2003, only to
decide not to participate in a subsequent retention election. 127 The recall
campaign stemmed from a single Supreme Court decision holding that the
legislature was required to fund public education, notwithstanding a constitutional provision requiring a two-thirds majority to pass tax bills. 128 In
2004, Iowa Senator Kenneth Veenstra urged voters to unseat four state supreme court justices in retaliation for a single decision in which the justices
voted to invalidate a law regulating tax rates for different types of
casinos. 129
As the foregoing incidents demonstrate, campaigns to oust incumbent
state judges on the basis of one or two controversial decisions have become
a regular feature of American political life. The trend toward increasingly
issue-oriented judicial elections shows no signs of abating and indeed, most
commentators expect it to accelerate. 13o At the same time, incidents of re122. Id. at 1137.
123. Jeff Woods, Public Outrage Nails a Judge, NASHVILLE BANNER (Nasvhille, Tenn.), Aug.
2, 1996. at AI.
124. Id. Commenting on White's removal, Tennessee Conservative Union President John Davies said, "'This is a historic decision where the people have started to take back the courts from
soft-on-crime judges.· .. Id.
125. Id.; Gerald F. Uelman, Judges Hear the Crocodiles Snapping; Justice: Nationwide, the
Trend is to Stifle Correct but Politically Unpopular Rulings, L. A. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1997, at Metro
B9.
126. Id.
127. Am. Judicature Soc'y, Judges under Fire, http://www.ajs.org/cjiicjUlre.asp (last visited
Feb. 10. 2(06) (citations omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. In the wake of Republican Party of Minn. v. White. 536 U.S. 765, 765 (2002) (holding
that candidates for judicial office have a First Amendment right to announce their views on disputed legal and political issues). many commentators have asserted that judicial elections will
become increasingly partisan. bitter, and expensive. See, e.g., Caufield, supra note 106, at 4
(noting that "more money and more organized interests equal more politically motivated attacks
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prisal against state judges who are not subject to elections 13l and even lifetenured federal judges have also become quite unremarkable. 132
The targeting of judges based on single issues clearly undermines decisional independence within the judiciary. As former California Supreme
Court Justice Otto Kaus explained, a judge is acutely aware of the possible
consequences of his decision in a controversial case.133 This awareness,
Kaus writes, is akin to "finding a crocodile in [the] bathtub when you go in
to shave in the morning. You know it's there, and you try not to think about
it, but it's hard to think about much else while you're shaving."134 Kaus's
view comports with survey results from 1991-a time when the judiciary
was arguably less politicized than it is today-showing that just over 60
percent of 369 electorally accountable judges then believed that retention
elections affect judicial behavior. 135 Approximately 28 percent of the respondents felt that elections made them "more sensitive to public opinion,"
on judges and judicial candidates," and that White will "further exacerbat[e] ... these trends");
Hon. Joseph M. Hood, Judicial Independence, 23 NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES J. 137,
139-40 (2003) (discussing the implications of the White decision for judicial independence vis-avis the role of "money and special interest groups").
Even before White was decided, the spectacular amount of money pouring into judicial elections nationwide both caused and reflected an increasingly politicized judiciary. Caufield, supra
note 106, at 5. Spending on elections for state supreme court justices, for example, reached a new
record in 2004, with $9.3 million spent to fill a single seat on the Illinois Supreme Court. Tim
Jones, Voters, Activists Put Heat on Judges; Interest Groups, Playing to Voter Resentment, Mount
TV Attack Ads, CHI. TRIBUNE, Dec. 5, 2005, at 1. Much of the money is spent on deceptive ads
that oversimplify judges' records. Id. In an archetypical example, one TV spot vilified a (soon-tobe-defeated) justice in West Virginia as "too dangerous for our kids." Id. The total tab for television advertising promoting and disparaging judicial candidates in fifteen states reached $21 million in 2004. Caufield, supra note 106, at 3.
131. Examples include a Massachusetts judge who was targeted by a state representative for
removal in 2()(x), based on a single instance of unacceptably "lenient" sentencing involving a
convicted child molester. Editorial, Lopez Not Issue, Independence Is, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 13,
2001, at 24. A Massachusetts state representative proposed removing all four justices who comprised the majority in Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 941 (Mass. 2003),
which legalized same-sex marriage in the state. Am. Judicature Soc'y, supra note 127. Chief
Justice Margaret Marshall was specifically targeted for removal by the Article 8 Alliance, an antigay marriage group. Id. In 2004, a Colorado state representative, backed by the Christian advocacy group Focus on the Family, introduced a resolution to impeach a Denver district judge for
allegedly violating the constitutional rights of a mother in a custody battle with her former lesbian
partner. Chris Frates, GOP Criticizes Group's Push to Impeach Judge, DENVER POST, Apr. 18,
2004, at B2. The mother had "embraced Christianity and renounced homosexuality," prompting
the judge to order her not to expose the child to religious doctrines or other teaching of a
homophobic nature. Id.
132. The American Judicature Society has documented fourteen incidents of reprisal, including calls for impeachment, against federal judges at all levels since 2001. Am. Judicature Soc'y,
supra note 127.
133. Uelman, supra note 96, at 1133.
134. Id. (footnote omitted). Kaus himself confessed that when he voted to uphold the constitutionality of a ballot initiative in 1982, his position might have been subconsciously influenced by
thoughts of his upcoming retention election. Eule, supra note 55, at 738 (footnote omitted).
135. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306, 312 (1994).
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and approximately 15 percent thought that "judges avoid[ed] controversial
cases or rulings before elections."136 While the survey's designers did not
speculate about the role of respondent bias in their survey, it is logical to
assume that some underreporting occurred, given that judges would likely
prefer to believe that their decisional independence is unaffected by political pressure.
Professor Gerald Uelman tested Kaus's "crocodile theory" by analyzing the actual effect of single-issue attacks against elected judges, and the
results are sobering. Describing the well documented backlash over antideath penalty rulings as "the fattest crocodile," Uelman concluded that political pressure is partly responsible for a remarkable and relatively recent
increase in the number of death sentences affirmed by six state supreme
courtS. 137 In 1985, these six courts affirmed 63 percent of death sentences
appealed.138 By 1995, that rate had jumped to 90 percent. 139 According to
Uelman's analysis, the rate at which judges affIrm death sentences appears
to correlate with methods of judicial selection: the less secure a judge's
position, the more likely she is to affIrm. 140
In addition to creating a climate in which judges' decisionmaking is
increasingly subject to political influence, the targeting of individual
judges-and the corresponding portrayal of them as activists in black
robes-has contributed to a troubling lack of public confIdence in the judiciary.141 More than six years ago, a study sponsored by the National Center
for State Courts found that 81 percent of people surveyed believed politics
influences judicial decisions.142 A 2005 poll by the ABA Journal revealed
equally concerning results. Among its fIndings: 56 percent of respondents
strongly agreed or somewhat agreed with the statement, "Judicial activism
... seems to have reached a crisis. Judges routinely overrule the will of the
people, invent new rights and ignore traditional morality."143

136. Id. at 312-13.
137. Uelman, supra note 96, at 1136 (analyzing affirmance rates in California, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1137 (For example, judges subjected to partisan contested elections affIrm at a rate
of 62.5 percent; judges appointed by executives without retention elections affirm only 26.3 percent of the sentences.).
141. See Editorial, Injudicious Intimidation: Objections over Courts Cross Line from Healthy
Criticism to Dangerous Threat, DETROIT FREE PREss, Apr. 16, 2006, at 2 (asserting that while
"speaking out" on judicial decisions" is good for democracy, "venom[ous]" remarks "can erode
public faith in justice").
142. Lauren Stiller Rildeen, Courting Change. Independently Watchful Eyes Still See Us as
World Model, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. IS, 2000, at C3.
143. Martha Neil, Half of U.S. Sees 'Judicial Activism Crisis', Sept. 30, 2005, http://www.aba
net.org/journaUredesignls30survey.html.
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Attacks on the Judicial Branch

The low level of confidence the judiciary enjoys among members of
the public undoubtedly enables numerous anti-court "reforms" to advance
further than they otherwise would. Indeed, proposals that would have
seemed unnecessary and even radical in bygone eras are now quite common. Many of them seek to undermine the structural integrity of federal and
state judiciaries in profound ways, revealing a deep contempt not only for
unpopular decisions, but for the very principle of judicial independence. 144
Contempt for the institution of the judiciary and widespread ignorance
of its counter-majoritarian role 145 are manifest in the remarks of political
actors nationwide. Former U.S. Representative Tom Delay once opined that
"an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history,"146 and at the zenith of
the Terri Schiavo controversy, he railed against "the 'arrogant, out-of-control, unaccountable' judiciary."147 More dramatically, evangelist Pat Robertson characterized the federal judiciary as more threatening to America
than were Nazi Germany, Japan, and the Civil War,148 and a Focus on the
Family spokesperson described "judicial tyranny" as "one of the biggest
threats to our civil and religious liberties."149 State legislators have also
joined in the verbal assault. For example, Alaska senator Loren Leman remarked that "The [Alaska Supreme Court] needs to be a reflection of Alaskan society and our values ... [a]nd if it isn't, then we need to get hold of
144. On the important distinction between criticizing specific decisions and disparaging the
judiciary as a whole, see Hodak:. supra note 107, at 3 (quoting Professor Michael Tigar's concerns
over "attacks by rnajoritarian institutions on the right of judges to make [countermajoritarian]
decisions"); Herman Schwartz, Editorial, The Nation; The Law; The War against Judiciallndependence, L.A. TIMES, May II, 1997, at M2 (distinguishing "justified and indeed necessary"
criticism of courts' performances from "[p]artisan attacks that undermine their independence").
145. See Neil, supra note 143 (referencing Professor Charles G. Geyh's observation that
[t]he idea that judges should 'somehow follow the voters' views ... reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of what judges are supposed to do'" and describing ABA
President Michael S. Greco's appointment of a nonpartisan Commission on Civic Education and the Separation of Powers to "educate Americans about the role of an independent judiciary in U.S. government.
146. Schwartz, supra note 144 (quoting Rep. DeLay). DeLay was one of seventy-four cosponsors of the Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, H.R. Res. 568, lO8th Congo
(2004). The resolution "express[ed] the sense of the House of Representatives" that federal courts
should cease using foreign legal sources to interpret U.S. law. Representative Tom Feeney, sponsor of the Resolution, threatened that "judges who based decisions on foreign precedents would
risk the 'ultimate remedy' of impeachment." Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes His Call for
Judicial Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,2005, at AlO. Commenting on Representative Feeney's remarks, Chief Justice William Rehnquist asserted that "it ha[s] been clear since early in the
country's history that 'a judge's judicial acts may not serve as a basis for impeachment.'" [d.
147. Jones, supra note 130 (quoting Rep. DeLay).
148. Derek Rose, Robertson: Judges Worse Than Al Qaeda, N.Y. DAlLY NEWS, May 2, 2005,
at lO.
149. Frates, supra note 131 (quoting Peter Brandt),
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it."lS0 And Florida representative Victor Crist identified "judges who do not
listen to the will of the people" as a problem the Florida legislature must
address. lSI
While the foregoing remarks illuminate the intensity of the backlash
against the American judiciary, the "remedies" some have proposed are better indicators of its potential implications. 1s2 In the U.S. Congress, bills
introduced since 1997 would subject federal judges to Senate reconfirmation after 10 years;lS3 limit federal judges' power to overturn state initiatives;lS4 prohibit federal courts from relying on foreign or international law
in interpreting the U.S. Constitution;lss and strip federal courts' jurisdiction
over suits challenging the Defense of Marriage Act, lS6 governmental displays of the Ten Commandments,lS7 and the recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance. 1s8 Former Federal Judge Robert Bork has advocated for a constitutional amendment that would empower Congress-with only a simple
150. Liz Ruskin, A Question of Balance: Court Rulings Ignite Conservative Backlash, Debate
over Judge Selection, ANCHORAGE DAlLY NEWS, Mar. 29, 1998, at Al (quoting Sen. Leman).
151. Tampa Tribune Editorial Board, Crist's Assault on the High Court, TAMPA TRIB., May
15, 2000, at 8 (quoting Rep. Crist).
152. Speaking before a Georgetown University audience in March 2006, former Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor cited the records of autocracies and former Communist countries and warned that politically-motivated interference with the American judiciary is placing the
U.S. "in danger of edging towards dictatorship." Borger, supra note 108.
153. H.R.J. Res. 77, 105th Congo (1997).
154. H.R. 1170, 104th Congo (1995); Judicial Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 1252, 105th Congo
(1997). Both bills would prohibit individual federal judges from enjoining any voter-enacted initiative on grounds of unconstitutionality and would require that any applications for injunction be
heard by three-judge panels.
155. Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th Congo (1995). Forty-six representatives cosponsored this bill.
156. Marriage Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1100, 109th Congo (2005). Seventy-five representatives co-sponsored the bill. (The Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (2000), allows
states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages granted by other states.)
157. Safeguarding Our Religious Liberties Act, H.R. 4576, 109th Congo (2005). Seven representatives co-sponsored the bill.
158. Id. In a typical example of the ubiquitous political grandstanding that occurs when unpopular court decisions are announced, numerous officials rushed to condeInn the Ninth Circuit
decision that undoubtedly motivated H.R. 4576. President Bush called "ridiculous" the outcome of
Newdow V. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a California school district's
policy of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance including the words "under God"
violated the Establishment Clause). Andrew Cohen, Editorial, The Dangers of Holding Courts in
Contempt, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 7, 2002, at B2. Senator Tom Daschle deemed the decision '1ust nuts," while Senator Robert Byrd described the authoring judges as "stupid" and Representative Joseph Pitts presciently opined that "it was time 'for Congress and the president to stand
up to the courts that have arrogated so much power to themselves.''' Id.
It must be noted that Congress has threatened to strip the courts' jurisdiction in the past, as in
the 1950s when outrage over desegregation was mounting. Mabin, supra note 109; see also Vitiello & Glendon, supra note 6, at 1294 (noting that in 1981 and 1982, members of Congress
introduced thirty bills attempting to strip federal courts' jurisdiction over challenges involving
school prayer, abortion, and busing). The fact that these efforts are nothing new provides little
comfort when one considers the larger context-social, political, economic, and technologica1fueling the current backlash against the judiciary. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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majority in both houses-to overrule the decisions of federal and state
judges. 159 In Florida, where the backlash against the state judiciary seems
especially virulent, state legislators have entertained a bill that would require incumbent appellate judges to win two-thirds majorities in retention
elections and restrict judicial oversight of lawyers' conduct to that which
occurs in court. 160 Florida politicians have also advocated a constitutional
amendment to remove death penalty cases from the state supreme court's
jurisdiction and make such cases the exclusive province of an autonomous
"death court," whose every member would be appointed by the governor. 161
Interest groups nationwide are gaining attention with their own antijudiciary proposals. One of the most noteworthy is a proposed amendment
to South Dakota's constitution that appeared on statewide ballots in November 2006. Sponsored by a "single-issue grassroots organization,"
J.A.I.L. 4 Judges (the Judicial Accountability Initiative Law) would have
ensured judicial accountability to "the People in mass" by empowering citizen grand juries to assess whether judges' decisions reflect "lawful conclusions."162 Another ambitious interest group, PeopleNotJudges.com, has
dedicated itself exclusively to "reining in runaway judges." 163 Among
other proposals, the group calls on Congress and the states to
pass a "Judicial Reform Amendment" to the U.S. Constitution
that would: (a) place a maximum ten year term limit on all federal
and state judges; and (b) provide that the "good behavior" standard of Article III, Section I shall be determined by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 164
159. Bob Herbert, Editorial, A Plan to Intimidate Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at A29
(citing ROBERT BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMMORAH: MODERN LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN DECLINE (HarperCollins 1996». Apparently unaware that such a draconian
change would require a constitutional amendment, Kentucky Representative Ron Lewis tried to
accomplish the same outcome by sponsoring The Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of 2004, H.R. 3920. Dahlia Lithwick, Not-So Supreme: The Dumb New Proposal to Veto
the Supreme Court, SLATE, Mar. 17, 2004, http://www.slate.comlidl2097306. On the subject of
judges disparaging their peers and the judiciary generally, see Andrew Cohen, Editorial, The Dangers of Holding Judges in Contempt, WASH. POST, Jul. 7, 2002, at B2.
160. Editorial, Vandals after Our Judiciary, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (St. Petersburg, Fla.),
Mar. 2, 2001, at 14A (citing H.R.J. Res. 627 (2001».
161. Editorial, Death of High Court Not in State's Interest, PALM BEACH POST (Palm Beach,
Fla.), Aug. 19,2000, at A14.
162. J.A.I.L. 4 Judges, J.A.I.L., http://www.jaiI4judges.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2007); Am.
Judicature Soc'y, Editorial, An Earthquake in South Dakota?, http://www.ajs.org/ajsiajs3ditorialtemplate.asp?contenUd=472 (last visited Apr. 26, 2006). Approximately 47,000 South Dakotans
signed the petition required to qualify J.A.I.L. for the statewide ballot. Jones, supra note 130.
Thankfully, the amendment was soundly defeated, with approximately 89 percent of voters opposed. Rebecca Fater, Marshall: Fight to Protest Courts, The Sun (Lowell, Mass.) Dec. 1, 2006,
at 1.
163. PeopleNotJudges.com, The Team, http://www.peoplenotjudges.comlaboutlteam.php (last
visited Apr. 25, 2006).
164. PeopleNotJudges.com, The Plan. http://www.peoplenotjudges.comlaboutiplan.php (last
visited Apr. 25, 2006).

2006]

THE GOVERNMENT WE DESERVE?

155

Activists at the ideological fringe are taking a multifaceted approach to
eliminate judicial independence. Aside from the ill~conceived legislative
"reforms" emerging at the state and federal levels, calls to cut funding for
the operation of the courts ring out from editorial pages and statehouses
alike. 165 Another tactic that has actually succeeded in thwarting the work of
the judiciary is legislative inaction on judicial nominations. 166
IV.

CONCLUSION

Are the attacks on judges and the judiciary a temporary reflection of
our anxiety at the beginning of a new century, or a sign that the American
system of government is changing in profound and permanent ways? In
contemplating this question, it is instructive to consider (1) the expanding
use of direct democracy to decide controversial matters of public policy;
and (2) the particularly virulent emotions courts arouse when they invalidate voter-approved initiatives. If current trends in the use of the initiative
and referendum continue-and especially if the federal government or additional states adopt direct democracy as a vehicle for lawmaking-outraged
majorities may ultimately succeed in transforming our historically independent judiciary into a bureau of "rubber-stampers" who are powerless to protect minority rights.
Advocates of judicial "reform" can easily exploit invalidated initiatives and referenda to generate support for their cause because judicial review of citizen lawmaking offends many Americans' core beliefs about
what our democracy is and should be. Notwithstanding the vision of this
country's founders, the idea that a desirable society is one where minorities
are protected in spite of majority preferences is counterintuitive and perhaps
even radical to many citizens. Given our collective belief in majority rule as
a good unto itself, Americans' growing outrage over judicial review in the
direct democracy context is not at all surprising. 167 Significantly, the out165. Robert Bauer, Editorial, A Court Too Supreme for Our Good, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2005,
at B3 (arguing that Congress should cut the Supreme Court's budget until the latter allows cameras in the courtroom); Editorial. Contempt of Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, May 9, 2002, at A18
(criticizing legislature's $40 million in. budget cuts to the state judiciary in 2001 and proposing
cuts of $60 million from a $500 million budget in 2002); PeopleNotJudges.com, supra note 164
(calling on Congress to freeze federal judges' salaries and cut the judicial budget by five percent
with the exception of salaries); Frank Phillips, Judges Wary of Challenging Beacon Hill, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 12,2001, at Bl (discussing the legislatures' use of the budget as a tool to infringe
state courts' autonomy).
166. Schwartz, supra note 144 (describing "stalling the judicial selection process itself' as
part of "the strategy for going after the federal bench"). After securing approval from the Senate
judiciary Committee for a federal judgeship in 1996, one nominee was asked to state her "views
in support or in opposition to [all 160] California initiatives in the last decade." ld.
167. Americans' relative ignorance about the three branches of government generally and the
role our framers envisioned for each one undoubtedly exacerbates the aspect of human nature to
equate majority rule with ideals such as fairness, justice, etc. In a recent poll sponsored by the
American Bar Association, 40 percent of those surveyed could not identify the three branches of
government. Neil. supra note 143. Fifty-six percent strongly agreed or somewhat agreed with the
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rage stems not from differences of opinion about whether minority rights
are violated by given ballot propositions, but from deeply-rooted convictions that it is nobler (or at least "fairer") to effectuate the will of the majority than to protect the rights of the minority.
When coupled with a growing certainty among interest groups and individuals about the ultimate righteousness of their preferred social policies,
the belief that majority rule is itself a moral good is deeply troubling. As
Judge Learned Hand so powerfully stated at a 1944 ceremony in honor of "I
Am an American Day":
The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is
right; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which seeks to understand
the mind of other men and women; the spirit of liberty is the spirit
which weighs their interests alongside its own without bias.... 168
It appears that direct democracy, at least in the twenty-six states that
currently practice it, is here to stay. And allowing citizens to act as
lawmakers is not necessarily or always undesirable-with one essential
qualification: the exercise of raw majority power must be subject to the
scrutiny of a robust and independent judiciary. To the extent that citizens
reject on principle the need for a counter-majoritarian force, the continued
expansion of direct democracy poses a clear threat to those outside the
American mainstream.

statement, "[Clourt opinions should be in line with voters' values, and judges who repeatedly
ignore those values should be impeached." Id.
168. Judge Learned Hand, Address at "I Am an American Day" Ceremony, N.Y., N.Y. (May
21, 1944), available at http://www.criminaljustice.org/public.nsflENews/2002e67?opendocument
(last visited Apr. 26, 2(06).

